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Abstract Strictly proper scoring rules are designed to truthfully elicit subjective
probabilistic beliefs from risk neutral agents. Previous experimental studies have
identified two problems with this method: (i) risk aversion causes agents to bias
their reports toward the probability of 1=2, and (ii) for moderate beliefs agents
simply report 1=2. Applying a prospect theory model of risk preferences, we show
that loss aversion can explain both of these behavioral phenomena. Using the in-
sights of this model, we develop a simple off-the-shelf probability assessment
mechanism that encourages loss-averse agents to report true beliefs. In an ex-
periment, we demonstrate the effectiveness of this modification in both eliminating
uninformative reports and eliciting true probabilistic beliefs.
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1 Introduction
Accurately obtaining subjective probabilistic information about uncertain future
events is an essential step in the decision making process in many different
economic and public policy settings. In many cases, rather than trying to build a
model to estimate probabilities, the best and most informative assessments come
from an agent who has a good amount of relevant experience and can use her
collected wisdom to estimate a subjective probability. Eliciting this information
presents an important and difficult problem in many fields such as finance and
macroeconomics (Diebold and Rudebusch 1989; Ghysels 1993), decision analysis
(Keeney 1982), and meteorology and weather forecasting (Murphy and Winkler
1984). In addition, probability assessments often comprise an important component
of economic experiments. Even when the ultimate objective is not to elicit
subjective beliefs, obtaining this information may be a critical secondary step in an
experimental procedure.
Well-designed scoring rules provide a useful tool for procuring this subjective
information by providing an agent with the right incentives to carefully evaluate and
quantify her beliefs, and to honestly reveal her subjective assessment of the
likelihood of these uncertain future events. The quadratic scoring rule (QSR), a
variant of which was first introduced by Brier (1950), is the most commonly used.1
The incentive design of scoring rules implicitly assumes, however, that the agent
is risk neutral, which contrasts with how people often behave. Winkler and Murphy
(1970) examine the effects of nonlinear utility on the optimal report under a proper
scoring rule, showing that risk aversion leads an agent to hedge her reports away
from categorical forecasts of 0 and 1 and risk seeking leads the agent to bias her
reports closer to 0 or 1. This biasing effect of risk preferences can be easily
corrected by applying the inverse utility function to the scoring rule (Winkler 1969).
In practice, however, an even more troubling pattern of excessive reports equal to
the baseline probability of 1/2 emerges as well, a phenomenon not explained by
classical expected utility models. For example, Offerman et al. (2009) tested
responses by 93 subjects to a QSR for objective probabilities that ranged from 0.05
to 1 and found that they reported 1/2 more than three times as often as they should
have (15.3 % versus 5 %). This particular type of conservatism inhibits the decision
maker’s ability to discern among a broad domain of moderate beliefs and conceals a
significant amount of useful information.
In this paper, we employ the insights of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky
1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992) to understand the ways in which an agent will
distort her report when she receives an uncertain reward from a QSR. Employing
Palley’s (2015) model of prospect theory with an endogenous reference point, we
highlight how loss aversion can account for why an agent may both report 1/2 for a
range of moderate beliefs and bias her reports toward 1/2 for beliefs closer to 0 or 1.
1 References include McKelvey and Page (1990), Offerman et al. (1996), Huck and Weizsa¨cker (2002),
Nyarko and Schotter (2002), Costa-Gomes and Weizsa¨cker (2008), Armantier and Treich (2013),
Offerman et al. (2009), Blanco et al. (2010), Andersen et al. (2010), and Kothiyal et al. (2011). For a
survey of the work on scoring rules and other belief elicitation methods, see Schlag et al. (2014)
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The main contribution of our paper is the introduction of a generalized
asymmetric QSR, the L-adjusted rule, which eliminates the incentives for
conservative reports and enables the elicitation of true probabilistic beliefs. The
payoffs in this L-adjusted rule are the same as in a classical QSR except negative
outcomes are shrunk by a factor of L, a parameter that controls the size of the loss
adjustment. We use previous experimental work estimating population parameters
to derive an off-the-shelf variant of this L-adjusted QSR that requires no prior
agent-specific calibration. In an experiment, we demonstrate its effectiveness in
recovering truthful and precise probability assessments, and show that it alleviates
the shortcomings associated with the classical QSR. In agreement with previous
results, we find that in response to the classical QSR, agents tend to report the
implicit benchmark probability of 1/2 for a wide range of beliefs near 1/2 in order to
ensure a certain payoff. By matching the choice of L to previous empirical estimates
of parameters for the overall population, we also obtain a modified QSR that
recovers truthful beliefs experimentally. In doing so, we provide a practical and
simple off-the-shelf scoring rule that encourages agents to report their beliefs
truthfully.
We want to emphasize that the use of the L-adjusted QSR is as easy as the use of
a standard QSR. Exactly as with a standard QSR, each subject receives a table that
lists how their payoff varies depending their probability judgment and the actual
outcome of the predicted phenomenon. The only difference between a standard QSR
and an L-adjusted QSR is that the actual payoffs in the table are changed to
accommodate subjects’ loss aversion. As a result, subjects are encouraged to
automatically report judgments that are very close to true objective probabilities.
The simplicity of our approach depends to a large extent on the fact that we
provide each subject with the same L-adjusted QSR based on parameter estimates
for the general population. A natural question is how much precision is sacrificed by
ignoring differences that may exist in people’s loss-aversion attitudes. To
investigate this question, we include a treatment in which we adjust the scoring
rule separately for each subject on the basis of an individually estimated loss
parameter. Interestingly, we do not find better results for this treatment.
Recently, several related approaches have been suggested to recover true beliefs
from conservative reports. Offerman et al. (2009) propose a revealed preference
technique that allows the researcher to correct the reported beliefs of agents who are
scored according to a standard QSR. In this method, agents initially provide reports
for a range of objective probabilities, which then yields an optimal response
mapping that can be inverted and applied to infer subjective beliefs from later
reports. In an experiment, Offerman et al. demonstrate the effectiveness of this
approach in recovering beliefs from reports that do not equal the baseline
probability of 1/2. Kothiyal et al. (2011) extend this method to overcome the
problem of discriminating between moderate beliefs in a range around the baseline
probability of 1/2, for which agents give the same optimal report. By adding a fixed
constant to one of the QSR payoffs, they both eliminate the excess of uninformative
baseline reports and yield an invertible response mapping that makes possible the
recovery of true beliefs, while maintaining the properness of the original scoring
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rule. Kothiyal, Spinu, and Wakker do not provide an experimental test of their
method.
The approaches taken in Offerman et al. (2009) and Kothiyal et al. (2011) are
precise and elegant because they do not need to make structural assumptions on how
people make decisions under risk. The downside of these methods is that they are
laborious to employ, because a sufficiently dense risk-correction map has to be
derived for each agent before any inferences can be made. In both decision analysis
and many experimental economics applications, the elicitation of beliefs is a
secondary goal, and a simpler and quicker approach may be preferred, as long as it
does not sacrifice precision. The method presented in this paper pursues this
purpose.
Other elicitation methods that do not make use of scoring rules exist as well. For
example, if the utility function is unknown, Allen (1987) presents a randomized
payment method that relies on the ‘‘linearization’’ of utility through conditional
lottery tickets to incentivize truthful reports. Alternatively, Karni (2009) proposes a
procedure with two fixed prizes where the payment function is determined by
comparing the agent’s report to a random number drawn uniformly from [0,1],
analogous to the Becker et al. (1964) mechanism. Under this method, if the agent
exhibits probabilistic sophistication, she has a dominant strategy to report her true
belief, irrespective of her risk attitudes. However, in experiments, subjects have
been found to have a hard time understanding Becker-DeGroot-Marschak-type
procedures (Rutstro¨m 1998; Plott and Zeiler 2005; Cason and Plott 2012), and
empirical comparisons of these methods with scoring rules have yielded mixed
results (Hao and Houser 2010; Hollard et al. 2010; Trautmann and van de Kuilen
2011).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 introduces our L-adjusted
QSR and characterizes the corresponding optimal reporting policy under the
prospect theory model of risk behavior. We discuss how this predicted behavior
provides a parsimonious explanation of previously observed conservative reporting
patterns and how the parameter L can be calibrated to allow for the recovery of
estimates of any probabilistic belief. Readers who are interested mainly in how well
our method encourages subjects to simply report true probabilities may skim Sect. 2
and refer to Proposition 1 and Corollary 1. Sections 3 and 4 detail the experiment
that we carried out to test the usefulness of this adjusted scoring rule in practice and
demonstrate its improvements over the classical QSR. Section 5 concludes and
Appendix 1 characterizes reporting behavior for the general asymmetric L-adjusted
QSR and contains proofs of all results. Appendix 2 in Supplementary Material
provides images and instructions from the experimental interface.
2 The model
We consider an agent who must report a subjective belief about the chances of an
uncertain future event A. Her true belief is that event A will occur (X ¼ 1) with
probability p and its complement A will occur (X ¼ 0) with probability 1 p. She
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submits a reported probability r 2 ½0; 1 that A will occur and receives a payoff
according to an L-adjusted QSR, a generalization of the asymmetric QSR
introduced by Winkler (1994).
Definition 1 (L-adjusted Quadratic Scoring Rule) The L-adjusted asymmetric
QSR is defined by
SLðX; rÞ ¼
ð1 cÞ2  ð1 rÞ2
c2L
if A occurs and r\c;
c2  r2
c2
if A occurs and r\c;
ð1 cÞ2  ð1 rÞ2
ð1 cÞ2 if A occurs and r c;
c2  r2
ð1 cÞ2L if
















In general, the L-adjusted QSR can be centered around any baseline probability c
of the event A occurring,2 but for most of the paper we will focus on the typical case
of a symmetric baseline c ¼ 1=2. When L ¼ 1 this scoring rule reduces to the
asymmetric QSR and when L ¼ 1 and c ¼ 1=2 it reduces to the classical binary
QSR.
The pattern of reporting behavior that previous studies have observed cannot be
explained by classical expected utility theory. Therefore, to understand how an
agent will respond to this risky payoff function, we apply a prospect theory model of
risk preferences. Prospect theory applies psychological principles to incorporate
several important and frequently observed behavioral tendencies into the neoclas-
sical expected utility model of preferences. This more flexible formulation provides
a useful descriptive model of choice under risk (Camerer 2000) and generally
includes four main behavioral components:
1. Reference Dependence The agent evaluates outcomes as differences relative to
a reference point rather than in absolute levels.
2. Loss Aversion Outcomes that fall below the reference point (‘‘losses’’) are felt
more intensely than equivalent outcomes above the reference point (‘‘gains’’).
3. Risk Aversion in Gains, Risk Seeking in Losses, and Diminishing Sensitivity to
Both Gains and Losses The agent tends to prefer a sure moderate-sized outcome
over an equal chance of a large gain or zero gain, but prefers an equal chance of
taking a large loss or avoiding the loss altogether over a sure moderate-sized
loss. In addition, the marginal effect of changes in the outcome for the agent
diminishes as the outcome moves away from the reference point.
2 The decision maker may find it useful to select an asymmetric baseline c 6¼ 1=2 if he expects the
assessed probability of the event to be particularly low (e.g. the probability of rain on a given day in a
desert location) or high (e.g. the probability of rain on a given day in a rainforest location). However, in
practice this baseline is usually taken to be c ¼ 1=2, as in the classical QSR.
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123
4. Probability Weighting The agent overweights probabilities close to 0 and
underweights probabilities close to 1.
Of critical importance in applying prospect theory to model choices under risk is the
determination of the reference point. Often the reference point is implicitly set to
equal 0, but this assumption may not be realistic when all outcomes are positive, as
is typical in practice when rewarding subjects for providing reports according to a
QSR. For example, if the reference point were taken to be 0, then all outcomes in
our experiment would be viewed as ‘‘gains’’ and the prospect theory model would
be unable to explain the observed reporting behavior.
Instead, we argue that even in settings where all outcomes are nominally positive,
an agent may still feel elation or disappointment based on whether the payoff she
receives falls above (a ‘‘gain’’) or below (a ‘‘loss’’) what she expected at the time
that she submitted her report. To model this, we assume that the agent possesses a
reference-dependent utility function of the form of Palley (2015), in which the agent
develops an expectation E about her outcome S from the scoring rule, and this
expected outcome then forms a natural reference point for her to evaluate the
outcome that she ultimately receives. This utility function extends existing models
of an endogenously determined reference point (see, e.g., Shalev (2000)) to
accommodate the case of an agent with prospect-theory-type preferences. This
model will provide a parsimonious explanation for the behavior that is observed,
and most importantly, can be readily used to provide a solution to the problem and
insight into why it works.
Specifically, we assume that when the agent’s outcome exceeds this expectation,
she feels an additional gain of ðS  EÞa, where a 2 ð0; 1 specifies the curvature of
her risk preferences. When her outcome falls below her expectation, she perceives
this as an additional loss equal to kðE  SÞa, where k 1 additionally
parameterizes the agent’s degree of loss aversion. Mathematically, this utility
function is specified by
vðS; EÞ ¼ E  kðE  SÞ
a
if S\E
E þ ðS  EÞa if SE:

If a ¼ 1, this formulation coincides with the loss-averse utility function detailed in
Shalev (2000). If a ¼ k ¼ 1, then this simplifies to the risk-neutral objective of
maximizing expected payoff that the definition of a proper scoring rule implicitly
assumes.3
In addition, we assume that the agent applies probability weighting functions
wþðpÞ and wðpÞ for scores that fall above and below E (positive and negative
events), respectively. wþðÞ and wðÞ are assumed to be strictly increasing with
3 Several existing studies estimate average parameters k and a for the general population using the
classical cumulative prospect theory model of Tversky and Kahneman (1992), who find k ¼ 2:25 and
a ¼ 0:88. In recent work, Tu (2005) finds k ¼ 3:18 and a ¼ 0:68, Abdellaoui et al. (2007) find k ¼ 2:54
and a ¼ 0:72, and Booij et al. (2010) estimate k ¼ 1:58 and a ¼ 0:86. While these estimates are derived
from a different model of risk (cumulative prospect theory with a fixed rather than endogenous reference
point), their interpretation corresponds directly to our model, so we use an average of these estimates as a
rough benchmark for a representative agent of the general population.
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wþð0Þ ¼ wð0Þ ¼ 0, wþð1Þ ¼ wð1Þ ¼ 1, and wþðpÞ þ wð1 pÞ ¼ 1 for all
p 2 ½0; 1.4 The ex ante expected-valuation that an agent receives from responding
to a binary scoring rule is then given by a probability-weighted sum over the
possible scores; VðEÞ ¼PS wðpSÞvðS; EÞ:5
Until this point, we still have not specified the details of how the reference point
E is determined. The motivating intuition we follow here is that the agent’s
expected-valuation of the prospect should be consistent with her expectation about
the prospect. In other words, if she uses E as her reference point in determining
VðEÞ, then the resulting expected-valuation should simply equal E itself.
Specifically, we assume that the reference point E is determined endogenously
according to the consistency equation VðEÞ ¼ E, as in Palley (2015). In this sense,
for a given prospect, a consistent reference point E is the expectation that perfectly
balances the agent’s potential gains against her potential losses, weighted according
to her beliefs of their respective likelihoods.
A consistent reference point E is the natural evaluation of a prospect for an agent
who carefully contemplates the possible outcomes and anticipates her possible ex
post feelings, providing a summary measure of how the agent evaluates the risk in
an ex ante sense. An agent who initially forms a reference point R higher than E will
find that her expected losses kðR  SÞa outweigh her expected gains ðS  RÞa,
causing her to adjust her expectation downward.
Conversely, an agent whose reference point is initially lower than E will find that
her expected gains outweigh her expected losses, causing her adjust her reference
point upward. A thoughtful agent will thus converge to a unique consistent
expectation E. This notion of expectations as an endogenously determined reference
point is introduced and developed in the models of Bell (1985), Loomes and Sugden
(1986), Gul (1991), Shalev (2000), and Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007).
Note that the relationship between the reference point and the valuation function
possesses an intentional ‘‘circularity,’’ which is an important part of the model. For
any prospect, there exists only one unique reference point E that satisfies V(E) = E,
and this is the reference point that represents the agent’s ex ante valuation of a given
prospect. It is this equation that ensures the consistency of the valuation function
and the reference point, and which pins down the appropriate expectation E.
Figure 1 displays an example of this reference point formation process. We see
that a loss-averse agent with subjective beliefs of p ¼ 0:7 would derive an ex ante
expectation of 0:17 from truthfully reporting r ¼ 0:7 in response to a QSR, while
4 These assumptions hold trivially for the unweighted case wðpÞ ¼ p and approximately for most existing
estimates of weighting functions that overweight low probabilities and underweight high probabilities.
For example, using Goldstein and Einhorn’s (1987) parameterization wðpÞ ¼ dpcdpcþð1pÞc, Abdellaoui
(2000) finds dþ ¼ 0:65, cþ ¼ 0:60, d ¼ 0:84 and c ¼ 0:65, Abdellaoui et al. (2005) find dþ ¼ 0:98,
cþ ¼ 0:83, d ¼ 1:35 and c ¼ 0:84 and Booij et al. (2010) estimate dþ ¼ 0:77, cþ ¼ 0:62, d ¼ 1:02
and c ¼ 0:59. We use a rough average of these existing estimates as a benchmark for a representative
agent for the overall population, but a number of other functional forms for the weighting functions could
be used as well (see, e.g., Prelec (1998)).
5 Further details about the mechanics and intuition of this model can be found in Palley (2015). In this
case decision weights reduce simply to weighted probabilities because there are only two possible
outcomes.
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deriving an ex ante expectation of 0:05 from reporting r ¼ 0:6. Both of these
reports are therefore dominated by reporting the baseline r ¼ 0:5, which yields an
outcome of 0 with certainty and a corresponding ex ante expectation of 0. Whereas a
risk-neutral agent would prefer to report r ¼ 0:7, which yields the highest expected
score, the loss-averse agent in this case will prefer to report r ¼ 0:5.
We assume that the agent seeks to maximize her expected outcome E over all
possible reports r 2 ½0; 1, subject to the consistency requirement, which essentially
means that the agent will consider her ex post prospects when she chooses her report
and forms her ex ante expectation about her outcome. The timeline of events is
displayed in Fig. 2.





















































wþð1pÞ is the agent’s loss-weighted odds ratio of event A:
The optimal consistent response function for more general (asymmetric) baseline
probabilities c can be found in Appendix 1.6
Proposition 2 For any positive linear rescaling of the payoffs
~SLðrÞ  aSLðrÞ þ b, a[ 0; b 2 R, the optimal consistent report remains ~rLðpÞ ¼
S(r,A) = 0.36
S(r, A¯) = −0.44
r = 0.6: [S] = 0.12
E = −0.05




S(r, A¯) = −0.96
Fig. 1 Two examples of an agent’s possible report choices and corresponding ex ante reference point
formation in response to an classical QSR with baseline c ¼ 0:5 when the agent believes the probability
of event A is p ¼ 0:7, has prospect theory parameters k ¼ 2:4 and a ¼ 1, and does not apply probability
weighting
6 If a ¼ 1, k ¼ 1, and wðpÞ ¼ p, then the optimal report is rðpÞ ¼ p and EðpÞ ¼ E½SðX; pÞ, the
expected score function in the simpler risk-neutral model (see Winkler (1994)). This behavioral model
therefore includes the risk-neutral model that proper scoring rules are based on as a special case, yielding
a consistent prediction regarding the reports and expected outcome. If the agent is risk-neutral, does not
over- or under-weight probabilities, and does not exhibit loss aversion, then the QSR retains its ex ante
incentives for truthful reporting.
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rLðpÞ and the corresponding optimal ex ante expected outcome is rescaled
according to ~EðpÞ ¼ aEðpÞ þ b.
In other words, in contrast to the predictions of the cumulative prospect theory
model with a fixed reference point and many classical utility formulations, the
agent’s behavior will be invariant to positive linear rescaling of the payoffs. This
means, for example, that the agent’s optimal behavior would not change if the
decision maker decided to pay her in a different currency with exchange rate a:1 or
pay her an additional fixed fee b for providing the report.
Figure 3 displays the shape of optimal reports as a function of the agent’s beliefs
p in response to the classical QSR. For a large region of moderate beliefs near 1=2,
the agent will prefer to simply report 1=2 in order to receive a payoff of 0 with
certainty. While the width of this region depends jointly on k, a, wþðÞ, and wðÞ, it
is largely driven by the loss aversion parameter k. The shape of the optimal
consistent report function closely mirrors the theoretical results of Offerman et al.
(2009). Here the decision maker cannot simply provide the agent with the classical
QSR and then infer her true beliefs from her report because the resulting response
agent believes
probability of
event A is p
agent chooses report r











gain or loss S(X, r) − E
Fig. 2 Timeline of the agent’s report choice, reference point formation, and ex post evaluation of the
event
Fig. 3 Optimal consistent report rðpÞ (the dashed line) to the classical QSR (c ¼ 0:5, L ¼ 1) for
k ¼ 2:4, a ¼ 0:8, and wðpÞ ¼ wþðpÞ ¼ p versus truthful reporting (the solid line)
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 are mapped to the conservative risk-free report of
1=2 (this is the flat region of the optimal report function). This means that observing
a report of 1=2, which may happen quite frequently if the agent is loss-averse and
has moderate beliefs, tells the decision maker only that the agent’s beliefs lie
somewhere within that interval.
2.1 Determining the L-adjustment
To recover true beliefs, the decision maker needs to instead adjust the scoring rule to
eliminate the ‘‘flat region’’ of conservative reports of 1=2, which will allow him to
invert the agent’s optimal report function rðpÞ and estimate p according to r1ðrÞ.
Sensitivity analysis suggests that loss aversion accounts for the largest proportion of
this conservative behavior. The best way to counteract this phenomenon, then, is to
adjust the scoring rule so that negative outcomes are less severe by a factor of 1
L
. By










the decision maker can squeeze the endpoints of the ‘‘flat region’’ of conservative
reports of 1=2 together and recover the agent’s true beliefs.
Corollary 1 The optimal adjustment when c ¼ 0:5 is given by




This calibration of L ¼ L eliminates the agent’s incentive to provide these
uninformative reports even for very moderate beliefs close to 1=2, and also removes
almost all of her distortion in the optimal reporting function. After receiving her
report, the decision maker can apply the inverse of the optimal report function to the
observed report r to recover the agent’s exact truthful beliefs p ¼ r1L ðrÞ. In the
absence of utility curvature and probability weighting (a ¼ 1 and wðpÞ ¼ p), the
optimal adjustment is simply equal to the loss aversion parameter (L ¼ k) and the
inversion step is unnecessary because the optimal report function is truthful
(rkðpÞ ¼ p).
In practice, an agent’s report may include a noisy error term , so that the agent
reports rLðpÞ þ  instead. This means that the inferred beliefs will also contain an
error of r1L ðrLðpÞ þ Þ  r1L ðrLðpÞÞ: However, since r1L ðÞ is differentiable and
close to the identity function for a broad range of reasonable parameter values, the
resulting error in inferred beliefs simply scales roughly equally to the size of the
original reporting error. Another concern with the L-adjustment method is that it
may become laborious if agents are very heterogeneous. In such a setting, the model
parameters a, k, and wðpÞ and the corresponding L would have to be estimated
10 T. Offerman, A. B. Palley
123
individually. Our experimental results show, however, that heterogeneity is only of
secondary importance and that our method does a remarkable job even without a
correction of individual differences.
Figure 4 displays the optimal reports in response to an L-adjusted scoring rule,
which is calibrated to average parameter estimates k ¼ 2:4, a ¼ 0:8, dþ ¼ 0:8,
cþ ¼ 0:7, d ¼ 1:1 and c ¼ 0:7 (yielding L ¼ 3:7) from the studies discussed in
footnotes 4 and 5 for the general population, for an agent with various actual loss
aversion parameters k, utility curvature parameters a, and both with and without
probability weighting. As might be expected, given that the adjustment is primarily
designed to address distortions due to loss aversion, optimal report functions are
most sensitive to misestimation of the parameter of loss aversion k, and are less
sensitive to variations in a and the probability weighting functions. This suggests
that if the decision maker does not want to assess individual parameters, the most
important measurement to focus on is k. We also see that if L is miscalibrated due
to errors in parameter estimates, he may observe reports both above and below the
true beliefs p, depending on whether the k estimate is too high or too low.
Next, note that any remaining difference between the optimal report function in
response to the L-adjusted rule and truthful reporting, which in theory could be
corrected by applying r1ðÞ to the observed report, would be completely swamped
by any noise in reports and the distortionary effects of errors in the parameter
estimates. As a result, in practice there is very little benefit to attempting to carry out
this second inversion step on the reports r. A more practical approach is to simplify
the assessment process by eliminating this second inversion step and taking the
reported probability as our estimate of the agent’s true beliefs. In doing so, the
decision maker should keep in mind the remaining potential for distortion, which is
mainly caused by incorrect estimation of the agent’s parameters, and understand
that her reports may be somewhat noisy due to this miscalibration.
If the decision maker wishes to avoid the potentially laborious process of
individually assessing parameter values for each agent beforehand, a simple
approach is to simply present the agent with the L-adjusted QSR with L ¼ 3:7 and
take her resulting report as the estimate of her true beliefs. If the decision maker
does want to spend some time and effort to estimate the agent’s parameter values
ahead of time, he should focus on accurately assessing her loss-aversion parameter
k, since this offers a fair amount of flexibility in calibrating the scoring rule, and
variation in the other parameter values has a less significant effect on the optimal
report function.
Below we outline a simple approach that the decision maker can use to estimate k
and L on an individual basis: first, assume that the agent’s utility curvature is a ¼ 1
and probability weighting function is wðpÞ ¼ p. This implies that for a 50–50 lottery
between receiving x1 and x2, where x1 x2, her consistent expectation is given by7
7 More generally, for any two outcomes x1  x2, where x1 occurs with probability p and x2 occurs with
probability 1 p, the consistent expectation in this case can be written as
E ¼ ðx2 þ kpx1=ð1 pÞÞ=ð1þ kp=ð1 pÞÞ.









Fig. 4 Optimal consistent reports rLðpÞ in response to the L-adjusted QSR with L ¼ 3:7 and c ¼ 0:5
when k ¼ 2:4, a ¼ 0:8, dþ ¼ 0:8, cþ ¼ 0:7, d ¼ 1:1 and c ¼ 0:7 versus truthful reporting (the solid
line). The upper graph considers varied values of k, keeping the other parameters fixed. The middle graph
considers varied values of a, keeping the other parameters fixed. The lower graph considers the cases of
probability weighting and no probability weighting, keeping the other parameters fixed
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E ¼ ðx2 þ kx1Þ=ð1þ kÞ: ð2Þ
Next, the agent is offered a choice from a carefully designed set of coin flips that
offer different payoffs depending on whether the coin ends up heads or tails. We
assume that the agent makes this choice so that she maximizes the consistent
expectation given in Eq. 2, meaning that she will prefer different lotteries for
different values of k. Specifically, the set of coin flips offered is designed so that
each lottery is the most preferred option for a specific interval of possible k values.
Once the agent selects her most preferred lottery from this set, the decision maker
can use her choice to make inferences about her loss aversion parameter, for ex-
ample, by taking the midpoint of the interval of k values for which that flip is the
most preferred. As noted in the discussion of Corollary 1, under these assumptions,
the optimal L-adjustment is then simply equal to that k estimate. An example of
such a set of coin flip lotteries and the k parameters implied by each can be found in
the description of the IC treatment in Sect. 3.
3 Experiment
Offerman et al. (2009) show that, in practice, proper scoring rules fail to elicit
truthful reports from human agents, with patterns of reporting behavior that match
the theoretical model of this paper. In this experiment we confirm the predictions of
the preceding theory and demonstrate the feasibility of the L-adjusted scoring rule
in recovering truthful beliefs from human subjects. In doing so, we demonstrate that
the L-adjusted rule provides a simple modification of the QSR that can be used for
most agents to obtain relatively accurate reports from the general population without
having to arduously assess individual parameter and curvature estimates. In
addition, we test several values of L and show that the proposed rescaling L ¼ 3:7
is indeed the most effective at eliciting truthful beliefs from agents.
3.1 Experimental design and procedures
The computerized experiment was carried out at the CREED laboratory of the
University of Amsterdam. Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate
population using the standard procedure, with a total of 183 subjects participating
in the experiment. Subjects earned on average 13.00 euros (€) for an experiment that
lasted approximately 35 min. Subjects read the instructions on their screen at their
own pace. After finishing the instructions, they had to correctly answer some control
questions that tested their understanding before they could proceed to the
experiment. Subjects also received a handout with a summary of the instructions
before beginning the experiment (Appendix 2 in Supplementary Material provides a
sample of the instructions).
We employed a between-subjects design, in which each subject participated in
exactly one of four treatments. The first three treatments differed only in the size of
the loss correction applied to the QSR. In the control treatment we used L ¼ 1,
which therefore corresponds to the classical QSR that has been previously employed
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in many experiments. We refer to this treatment as NC (mnemonic for no
correction). In treatment medium correction (MC), we applied a moderate-sized
correction of L ¼ 1:5 and in treatment large correction (LC) we applied the large
loss correction of L ¼ 3:7 derived and predicted to be optimal in Sect. 2.1.
In each of these three treatments, subjects were informed that the experiment
would last for 20 rounds and that at the end of the experiment one of the rounds
would be randomly selected and used for actual payment. In each round, a subject
was asked to give a probability judgment that a randomly drawn number from the
set f0; 1; . . .; 99; 100g would be in the range f0; 1; . . .; Yg. The randomly drawn
number was an integer and subjects knew that each number in the set
f0; 1; . . .; 99; 100g was equally likely. The range was given at the start of a round
and differed across rounds. The lower bound of the range was 0 and the upper
bound, which determined the true objective probability, differed across rounds. In
the 20 rounds we used the Y values f5; 10; . . .; 30; 33; 35; 40; . . .; 95g, in a random
order. For example, in the round that used Y ¼ 45, the subject was asked to give the
probability judgment that the randomly drawn integer would fall in the set
f0; 1; . . .; 45g. While the subject was free to report any probability that he or she
wanted, the objective probability of this event is given by p ¼ Yþ1
101
, so in the
example of Y ¼ 45 the true probability was p ¼ 46
101
. Each subject was presented
with the ranges in a random order to prevent the possibility that order effects might
confound the results. Subjects did not receive any feedback between successive
rounds, so there was no opportunity to learn from previous rounds.
Subjects were given a handout with a tabular depiction of the L-adjusted QSR
that pertained to their treatment. The table clarified how their possible payoffs
would change depending on what probability they reported. The scoring rules were
in units of euros rescaled by a factor of 3 and shifted upward by 12, so that payments
ranged between a minimum of €3 and a maximum of €15, and participants could
assure themselves a payoff of €12 by always reporting r ¼ 0:5.
Appendix 2 in Supplementary Material includes the three payoff tables that we
used in the experiment. When a subject had tentatively decided which report r he or
she wanted to provide in a given round, they were asked to type this probability
judgment into a box on the upper part of the screen. Once this response was entered,
the lower part of the screen then automatically displayed the relevant part of the
payoff table with the current decision highlighted. Using arrows, subjects could
scroll through the payoff table and if they desired, increase or decrease their report
until they settled upon an ultimate response. Their choice was not finalized until
they clicked the button ‘‘Satisfied with choice’’ (Appendix 2 in Supplementary
Material shows the decision screen). After a subject had provided all 20 responses,
the computer randomly selected exactly one round (indexed by the upper bound of
its range Y), which then determined his or her payment as follows: first, the
computer drew a random integer from the set f0; 1; . . .; 99; 100g and determined
whether the number was in the range f0; 1; . . .; Yg of that round or not. Second, the
payoff was determined by inputting both the realization of whether the number was
in the range or not and the subject’s probability judgment r for that round into to the
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scoring rule that the subject had faced. At the end of the experiment subjects filled
out a questionnaire and were privately paid their earnings.
In the fourth treatment we provided each subject with an individually calibrated
L-adjusted rule.8 We included this treatment individual correction (IC) to
investigate how much precision was lost by correcting each subject with the same
L-adjusted QSR. The uniform loss corrections that we use in MC and LC may not
work well when subjects differ substantially in their loss-aversion attitudes.
Treatment IC consisted of two parts: At the start, subjects were informed that they
would make 21 decisions in total, 1 in part 1 and 20 in part 2, and that at the end of
the experiment one of these 21 decisions would be selected at random for actual
payment. While making their decision for part 1, subjects did not yet have access to
the instructions of part 2. In part 1, each subject chose one of the 12 options listed in
Table 1. Subjects were told that if this decision were selected for payment, their
chosen option would determine their payment together with the outcome of a
random coin toss by the computer. If the coin flip came up heads (tails), then the
payoff in the second (third) column would apply.
The fourth column of Table 1 lists the L parameter implied by a subject’s choice
(this was not observed by our subjects). After part 1, subjects proceeded with part 2,
which was the same as in the other three treatments, except for the fact that each
subject was provided with their own individual L-adjusted scoring rule
corresponding to their choice in part 1. The 12 possible payoff tables for these
L-adjusted QSRs are included in Appendix 2 in Supplementary Material.










1 24.25 3.00 1.0 (k 1:25) 7 8.6 (12.1)
2 23.00 4.00 1.5 (1:25 k 1:75) 2 11.6 (10.4)
3 21.25 5.00 2.0 (1:75 k 2:25) 1 24.9 (18.3)
4 19.00 6.00 2.5 (2:25 k 2:75) 13 8.7 (9.9)
5 16.25 7.00 3.0 (2:75 k 3:25) 9 9.4 (13.8)
6 13.00 8.00 3.5 (3:25 k 3:75) 8 6.9 (9.4)
7 11.50 8.40 4.0 (3:75 k 4:25) 7 6.6 (5.8)
8 10.65 8.60 4.5 (4:25 k 4:75) 1 47.3 (29.4)
9 9.65 8.75 5.0 (4:75 k 5:25) 1 10.5 (9.7)
10 9.47 8.84 5.5 (5:25 k 5:75) 0 –
11 9.18 8.89 6.0 (5:75 k 6:25) 0 –
12 8.93 8.93 7.0 (k 6:25) 1 1.9 (3.8)
The left 3 columns list the options between which the subjects in part 1 of treatment IC were asked to
choose; earnings are denoted in euros. The fourth column lists the L-parameter implied by a choice. The
fifth column lists how often each option was chosen and the final column lists, for each option, subjects’
average absolute deviations of the reported probabilities r from the true probabilities p (as determined by
the range Y according to p ¼ ðY þ 1Þ=101), with the standard deviations in parentheses
8 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this treatment.
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We ran two separate sessions for each treatment. In total, 45 subjects participated
in NC, 42 subjects in MC, 46 subjects in LC, and 50 subjects in IC.
4 Experimental results
We start with a brief description of the individual differences in treatment IC listed
in Table 1. In part 1, 74 % of the subjects chose options that correspond to moderate
L parameters in the range ½2:5; 4. The most common deviation was for subjects to
behave risk-neutrally and choose option 1; 14 % of our subjects behaved in this
way. The final column of Table 1 displays the absolute difference between reported
and true probabilities, averaged for all individuals who chose the same option in part
1. Interestingly, there is no clear relation between a subject’s implied L parameter
and the average absolute deviation of the reports from the true probabilities.
Subjects with large loss adjustments can be corrected roughly as well as subjects
with small loss adjustments.
Figure 5 provides an overview of the results by graphing the average reported
probabilities in each treatment as a function of the true objective probability p. The
solid black line presents the ideal report function of correct objective probabilities
r ¼ p. The control treatment NC displays a commonly observed pattern for data
collected with uncorrected scoring rules. Subjects overwhelmingly bias their reports
in the direction of risk aversion by reporting probabilities that are closer to 50 %
than the true probabilities. In the treatment with a medium correction MC, subjects’
these differences are substantially diminished compared to the control treatment, but
a systematic bias in the direction of risk aversion still survives. The treatment with
individual corrections IC provides on average the same results as MC when the true
probability is below 50 % but better results for true probabilities above 50 %.
However, under the treatment with a large loss correction LC, the systematic bias
Fig. 5 Average reported probability function rðpÞ for each treatment versus the true objective probability
report r ¼ p. Note that probabilities in the graph are written in percentage terms (% from 0 to 100) rather
than decimal units (0–1)
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vanishes and the average reported probabilities are almost identical to the true
probabilities across the whole range of p 2 ½0; 1.
A good elicitation method not only avoids systematic biases but also minimizes
variance in the reported probabilities, so that reports will be both honest on average
and relatively precise, meaning that a typical deviation from the honest report will
not be too large. Figure 6 provides a more detailed view of reports in each treatment
by adding standard deviations above and below the average reported probabilities.
For treatments NC and MC, the standard deviation is smallest for the true
probability of 50 % and increases proportionally with the distance between the true
probability and 50 %. The picture is somewhat different for treatments LC and IC,
in which the standard deviation gradually diminishes as the probability increases.
Figure 7 displays the median reports in each treatment, which provides another
perspective of the ‘typical’ behavior under each treatment. We can see that median
reports in the control treatment NC display a wide flat region of uninformative
reports near 0:5 that is predicted by the preceding theory. This characteristic flat
region, which is highlighted more readily by the computation of the proportion of
50 % reports in Table 2 below, is masked in the graphs in Fig. 6 because the
underlying flat region is averaged against more extreme reports.
Table 2 compares the performance of the treatments with respect to six measures.
First, for each subject we computed the average absolute difference between the
reported and true probabilities. Both treatments MC and LC that apply a loss
correction perform substantially better than the control treatment without such a
correction, with absolute errors roughly halved. Mann-Whitney tests that use
average statistics per subject as data points reveal that the differences between MC
and NC and between LC and NC are both significant. Thus, in both treatments
where a uniform loss-correction is applied (MC and LC), subjects’ reported
probabilities are systematically closer to the actual probabilities than without a loss-
correction (NC). Treatment LC performs on average somewhat better than MC, but
this difference is not significant. Surprisingly, treatment IC produces on average
somewhat worse results than LC and MC, but the differences are far from
significant. Like MC and LC, IC yields a clear and significant improvement
compared to NC.
A similar picture emerges for our second error measure, which is based on
subjects’ average squared differences between reported and true probabilities.
Again, the MC, LC, and IC treatments substantially and significantly outperform the
control treatment NC, and while LC additionally seems to do a somewhat better job
than MC and IC, the latter differences are not significant.
As a third measure, we computed the Spearman rank correlation between
reported and true probabilities for each subject. Ideally, a belief elicitation measure
would elicit beliefs that perfectly correlate with true probabilities. In studies that
employ uncorrected scoring rules, it is well known that a few subjects are very much
attracted by the sure payoff corresponding to a report of 50 %, which results in a
poor correlation between reported and true probabilities. Table 2 shows that indeed
MC and in LC produce substantially and significantly higher Spearman rank
correlation coefficients than NC does. Likewise, IC also yields a clearly larger
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correlation than NC, but this difference fails to reach conventional significance
levels. The differences between MC, LC and IC are again insignificant.
As a fourth measure, we compare the treatments to the extent that they induce
uninformative 50 % reports. If subjects were to always report true probabilities,
reports of 50 % should occur in only 1=20th of the cases. NC and MC substantially
overshoot this ideal benchmark, with frequencies of 50 % reports equaling 39.8 and
23.5 %, respectively. In comparison, IC and in particular LC perform very well,
producing such reports only 16.0 and 10.1 % of the time, respectively. All pairwise
differences between the treatments are significant with respect to this frequency of
50 % reports, except the one between MC and IC and the one between LC and IC.
The fifth measure focuses on the frequency of uninformative 50 % reports when
the true probability equals 45 or 55 %. As explained in Sect. 2, loss corrections are
expected to matter most for such true probabilities close to 50 %. In agreement with
the theoretical arguments, the difference in the frequency of reports of 50 % is
particularly large in this category. NC and MC perform especially poorly with
respect to this benchmark, with frequencies of 50 % reports equaling 62.2 and
39.3 %, respectively. Again, LC and IC do a much better job in comparison; in these
treatments, such reports occur only 22.8 and 24.0 % of the time, respectively.
Finally, our sixth measure makes precise the extent to which the three treatments
suffer from systematic risk biases. For each subject, we computed how much on
average a subject biased the report in the direction of 50 %. If the average risk bias
is positive (negative) then this provides evidence that subject are risk averse (risk
seeking). Consistent with Fig. 6, the final column of Table 2 shows that subjects are
bFig. 6 Average reported probability function rðpÞ with þ= one standard deviation for each treatment
versus the true objective probability report r ¼ p. Note that probabilities in the graphs are written in
percentage terms (% from 0 to 100) rather than decimal units (0 to 1)
median
Fig. 7 Median reported probability function rðpÞ for each treatment versus the true objective probability
report r ¼ p. Note that probabilities in the graph are written in percentage terms (% from 0 to 100) rather
than decimal units (0 to 1)
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very biased in the direction of risk aversion in treatment NC. In treatments LC and
IC, there is almost no bias, and the bias in treatment MC falls roughly in the middle
of the other treatments. All risk bias differences between the treatments are highly
significant, except the one between MC and IC.
Figure 8 shows how average absolute errors jr  pj in the report vary with the
objective probability p in each of the treatments. The uncorrected scoring rule
performs well precisely where we would expect it to—the incentives to make a
conservative baseline report of 50 % impel almost unanimously honest reporting
when the objective probability is in fact very close to 50 %. However, the
uncorrected scoring rule performs far worse than the loss-corrected scoring rules
when the true probabilities are larger than approximately 65 % or smaller than
approximately 35 %. In other words, errors in the uncorrected scoring rule occur
exactly in cases where the effects of loss and risk aversion kick in most heavily.
Overall, the uncorrected scoring rule thus proves to be unreliable for eliciting
subjective beliefs, since the decision maker does not know which of these regions
the true probability belongs to.
Figure 9 displays the empirical density of the Spearman-rank correlation
coefficients in the three treatments. In all treatments most subjects have fairly high
Spearman-rank correlation coefficients larger than 0.9, while a few subjects have
very low coefficients smaller than or equal to 0.5. The treatments differ primarily in
the relative frequency of these two categories of correlation coefficient (high or
low). The proportion of overly cautious or haphazard reporters with a low
coefficient of less than or equal to 0:5 equals 20.0 % in NC, 14.0 % in IC, 7.1 % in





















Fig. 8 Average absolute error jr  pj in the reported probability function rðpÞ for each treatment. Note
that probabilities in the graph are written in percentage terms (% from 0 to 100) rather than decimal units
(0–1)
9 In total, 6 subjects in NC, 2 subjects in MC and 1 subject in IC reported 50 % in every round, while no
subject in the LC treatment reported 50 % in every round. In contrast, the proportion of consistent
reporters with a coefficient of at least 0.9 equaled 60.0 % in NC, 73.8 % in MC, 78.0 % in IC and 80.4 %
in LC.
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5 Discussion
In practice, quadratic and other proper scoring rules can fail to recover the true
probabilistic beliefs that they are designed to elicit. Distortions in agents’ reports
generally take one of two forms: first, a risk-averse agent may bias her report away
from categorical beliefs of 0 and 1, as predicted by, for example, the theory of
Winkler and Murphy (1970). Second, a risk-averse agent with moderate beliefs
close to the baseline probability of 1=2 may revert to simply reporting 1=2 in order
to receive a risk-free payoff. In other words, under proper scoring rules such as the
classical QSR, we should expect to see a large proportion of uninformative reports
of r ¼ 0:5, and even strong beliefs near 0 or 1 will be skewed toward this focal point
of c ¼ 0:5. This pattern of conservative behavior, which has been observed
experimentally by, for example, Offerman et al. (2009) and in the experiment of this
paper, is explained by the prospect theory model in Sect. 2 of this paper.10
The predictions of this theory reinforce the existing result that agents may not
reveal their true beliefs even when assessed by a proper scoring rule, and provide an
explanation for when and why we might expect to see these two forms of
distortions. As demonstrated in Sect. 2, both effects appear to be largely driven by
loss aversion, which motivates the agents to seek a certain payoff when they have
moderate beliefs and to lower their risk by generally shading their reports closer
toward 1=2 for stronger beliefs. The intuition here is that reporting something other
0.5 0.6 0.7
Spearman rank correlation between r and p
0.8 0.9 1
Fig. 9 Histogram of the Spearman-rank correlation (SRC) between the true probabilities p and the
subject’s reported probabilities r. The figure displays for each SRC the percentage of subjects that fall in
the interval [SRC - 0.05, SRC ? 0.05]. The few observations where SRC\ 0.5 are added to SRC = 0.5
10 In situations where agents receive rewards from reporting beliefs and from making additional
decisions, other distortions may emerge. In such cases, agents may hedge their beliefs, for example in
order to guarantee a minimal payoff. The extent to which hedging biases reports when beliefs are
incentivized is discussed in Blanco et al. (2010) and Armantier and Treich (2013).
22 T. Offerman, A. B. Palley
123
than 1=2 introduces uncertainty into the payoffs, so that some outcomes will be felt
as gains and some outcomes will be felt as losses. As a result, a loss-averse agent
with beliefs close to 1=2 (who doesn’t have much better information than the default
baseline prediction) will not find it worthwhile to expose herself to the possibility of
these losses. The L-adjusted QSR, which generalizes the classical QSR, can be
calibrated to correct for both forms of distortions predicted by this prospect theory
model of optimal reports. The L-adjusted QSR provides a simple scoring rule that
can be used in a straightforward manner to elicit an agent’s true subjective
probabilistic beliefs. The main challenge in successfully implementing this rule is
that the optimal choice of L requires an accurate estimate of the agent’s parameters
a, k, and wðpÞ. In particular, when applying this adjustment the decision maker
needs to be careful not to use an unsuitable value of L. For example, an agent who is
truly risk neutral will respond to an L-adjusted scoring rule by biasing her reports
away from 1=2 for any choice of L[ 1.
Our experimental results demonstrate that the biases in people’s reports respond
to the adjusted QSR as predicted by the theory. Our data suggests that the optimal
calibration of L ¼ 3:7 for the average population does indeed perform better than
the other treatments, but even the moderate-sized correction of L ¼ 1:5 provides a
vast improvement over the classical unadjusted QSR. The major potential benefits
of this L-adjustment include eliminating the flat region of reports r ¼ 1=2 for
moderate beliefs, which are uninformative and prevent the optimal report function
from being inverted, and de-biasing reports, so that they provide truthful subjective
beliefs on average.
In theory, when processing reports, an decision maker would need to implement
an additional second step of computing r1L ðÞ and inferring true beliefs according
to r1L ðrÞ rather than simply using the raw report r as the estimate. In practice,
however, the impact of this additional step will be very small and likely dwarfed by
noise in the reports and errors in the calibration of L to the agent. Our experiment
confirms that the second step is indeed unnecessary, and that reports can be simply
recorded as provided in a straightforward manner.
For the general population, L ¼ 3:7 does seem to be the best adjustment to use, as
predicted by applying existing empirical estimation of population parameters to our
theoretical results and as evidenced in our experiment. Importantly, a more
laborious procedure in which we provide each subject with an individually
calibrated L-adjusted rule produces slightly worse results. The difference in
performance is small though, and far from significant. One possible explanation is
that we did not estimate subjects’ loss aversion parameters with sufficient precision.
An avenue for future research is to try to improve the results of the IC treatment by
estimating a subject’s loss-aversion parameter on the basis of a series of choices.
Our conjecture is that the potential benefits of such an approach are limited. As the
results of our paper indicate, no systematic risk bias remains when subjects are
adjusted with the L ¼ 3:7 rule. Moreover, absolute differences between reported
and true probabilities are small under this approach, leaving very little scope for
improvement.
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Finally, we would like to emphasize that while we only formally examined L-
adjustments to a QSR, an exactly analogous adjustment could be applied to any
other proper scoring rule with bounded payoffs. Applying the same analysis of
behavior under risk will yield similar results; we would expect loss aversion to
induce both a region of uninformative baseline reports for moderate beliefs and
reports that are biased away from the agent’s true belief for stronger beliefs. The
same L-adjustment should be equally effective at recovering informative responses
by pulling the endpoints of the interval of baseline reports together until this ‘‘flat
region’’ in the response function is eliminated. While there exists a closed-form
solution for these results under the QSR, these optimal response functions and L-
adjustments would have to be solved numerically for more general scoring rules.
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Appendix 1
Reporting under a general asymmetric L-adjusted QSR
To derive a closed-form solution for the optimal reporting strategy in response to a
general asymmetric L-adjusted QSR, we need to make an additional assumption on
reporting behavior:
Definition 2 (Directional Reporting) We say that the agent’s reporting preferences
are directional if p c ) r c and p c ) r c for any beliefs p.
Directional reporting holds automatically in the optimal reporting strategy when
the baseline c ¼ 0:5 (this follows through a symmetry argument, see the proof of
Proposition 1 for details) as in the classical QSR, and approximately for a broad
range of realistic parameter values when c 6¼ 0:5. Assuming directional reports is
natural in the context of real-world agents who are asked to provide a report of their
beliefs relative to some baseline, asserting that reporting behavior will be restricted
to shading reports either toward or away from the baseline probability of c. While
this assumption is not required to compute an agent’s optimal consistent report
function, we will assume that it holds for the analysis that follows because it allows
for closed-form solutions.
Proposition 3 If the agent reports directionally, the optimal consistent report
function to an asymmetric L-adjusted QSR is
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where KðpÞ ¼ kwðpÞ
wþð1pÞ is the agent’s loss-weighted odds ratio of event A.
As before, the results are preserved under arbitrary positive linear rescaling of the
payoffs. In other words, for any positive linear rescaling of the payoffs
~SLðrÞ  aSLðrÞ þ b, a[ 0; b 2 R, the optimal consistent report remains ~rLðpÞ ¼
rLðpÞ and the corresponding optimal expected outcome is simply rescaled according
to ~EðpÞ ¼ aEðpÞ þ b.
The decision maker should then calibrate the L-adjusted QSR by selecting the





















in order to eliminate the flat region of uninformative reports of c.
Proofs of Propositions 1–3 and Corollary 1
Proof of Proposition 1 This result is a special case of Proposition 3, with L ¼ 1,
a ¼ 1, and b ¼ 0. Note that directionality holds automatically if c ¼ 0:5. To prove
this, it is sufficient to show that EðpÞ E^ðpÞ for p 0:5 and E^ðpÞ EðpÞ for
p 0:5 whenever the expectations EðpÞ and E^ðpÞ are both consistent. Observe that
when c ¼ 0:5, Eðr j pÞ ¼ E^ð1 r j 1 pÞ; where Eðr j pÞ denotes a consistent
expectation from reporting r when the probability beliefs is p. Since
rðpÞ ¼ 1 r^ð1 pÞ, we have that EðrðpÞ j pÞ ¼ Eð1 r^ð1 pÞ j pÞ ¼
E^ðr^ð1 pÞ j 1 pÞ; or EðpÞ ¼ E^ð1 pÞ. In particular, this means that
Eð1=2Þ ¼ E^ð1=2Þ and EðpÞ and E^ðpÞ are symmetric around p ¼ 0:5. Then to
prove directionality it suffices to show that EðpÞ is decreasing in p. As shown in
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ðwþð1pÞÞ2  0, so
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dp
rðpÞ 0. Then by the




EðpÞ 0, which implies that EðpÞ is decreasing in p, E^ðpÞ is
increasing in p, and the agent will prefer to report r  0:5 for p 0:5 and r  0:5 for
p 0:5. h
Proof of Proposition 2 This result also follows from Proposition 3, by setting
L ¼ 1 and comparing the case where a ¼ 1, and b ¼ 0 to the case of general a and
b. The optimal consistent report function is the same in both cases, and after
simplifying the expressions for the corresponding consistent expected outcome, we
also have that ~EðpÞ ¼ aEðpÞ þ b for all p. h
Proof of Proposition 3 By Lemma 1 of Palley (2015), for any risky prospect that
yields a payoff of y with probability p and z with probability 1 p, where y z,
there exists a unique consistent expected outcome E 2 ½y; z such that VðEÞ ¼ E,
which means there will be a unique E associated with any report r: Consider an L-
adjusted asymmetric QSR whose payoffs have been rescaled by an arbitrary positive
linear transformation aSLðX; rÞ þ b, a[ 0; b 2 R. The agent must consider three
separate cases when selecting the value of r to report: h
Case 1 (r\c): SLðrÞ ¼
a
ð1 cÞ2  ð1 rÞ2
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, reporting r\c is not optimal.
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Case 2 (r[ c): SLðrÞ ¼
a
ð1 cÞ2  ð1 rÞ2
ð1 cÞ2 þ b\b if A occurs
a
c2  r2







meaning that a c
2r2
ð1cÞ2L þ b\E\ a
ð1cÞ2ð1rÞ2
ð1cÞ2 þ b and
vðSLðrÞ; EÞ ¼
E þ a ð1 cÞ
2  ð1 rÞ2
ð1 cÞ2 þ b  E
 !a
if A occurs
E  kðE  a c
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ð1 cÞ2L þ b
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Consistency requires that wþðpÞ E þ ða ð1cÞ
2ð1rÞ2
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meaning that r^ ¼ L
Kð1pÞ1aþL
: However, this is only consistent for r[ c, so this
reporting strategy is optimal only if L
Kð1pÞ1aþL





















, reporting r[ c is not
optimal.
Case 3 (r ¼ c): SðrÞ ¼ b, meaning that E ¼ b and vðSðrÞ; EÞ ¼ b. Then
consistency is satisfied since VðEÞ ¼ b ¼ E.
Then for any belief p, the agent has three reporting choices:
1. r\c, in which case she will receive EðrðpÞÞ
2. r[ c, in which case she will receive E^ðr^ðpÞÞ, or










































































we have r ¼ L
Kð1pÞ1aþL




















Under the assumption of directional reporting, this simply reduces to r ¼ L
Kð1pÞ1aþL















The consistent ex ante expected outcome corresponding to the optimal consistent






























































































ð1 cÞ2  Kð1 pÞ
1
a













ð1 cÞ2 1þ Kð1 pÞ1a

























































. This means that




, or ðLÞawð1=2Þ þ kwð1=2Þ ¼ ðLÞa. Rearranging terms,
ðLÞa ¼ kwð1=2Þ
1wð1=2Þ ; which yields the desired result. h
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